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I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation has gained substantial recognition in recent years as an effi-
cient alternative dispute resolution technique. The technique uses a neutral third
party to facilitate resolution by encouraging and assisting parties in reaching
their own mutually acceptable agreements. The settlement process relies upon
an informal, non-adversarial atmosphere that fosters dependable and effective
communication, which ensures productive working relationships among all in-
terested participants. Of course, key to the Preservation of this crucial atmos-
phere is the concept of total confidentiality regarding communications made
during the mediation.
3
Despite the informal nature of the mediation process, a successful out-
come leads to a formal settlement agreement enforceable against all involved
parties. Occasionally, the participants in a mediation disagree on what they set-
tled, or, even if the terms of a settlement are acknowledged, one party may chal-
lenge their validity on the grounds of fraud, duress, or lack of authority. 4 Thus,
when disputes arise over the enforcement of mediated settlement agreements,
courts often apply traditional contract law principles in order to decipher the
truth behind each settlement. These traditional contract principles often need
the admission of evidence of what transpired during the mediation, leading
many scholars to question the wisdom of maintaining total confidentiality when
subsequent disputes arise over the enforcement of mediated agreements. 5 In
particular, these scholars are calling for an exception to mediation confidential-
ity that would require the mediator to testify in certain agreement enforcement
I See, e.g., Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators Can
Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 629, 629 (1997).
2 Confidentiality protects a wide range of communications including those between the par-
ticipants during the mediation as well as those outside the mediation as to third parties. Due to the
complexity of this topic, this Comment will focus on the scope of confidentiality as it applies to
outside communications after the mediation session, mainly the right of the mediator to refuse to
answer questions in court.
3 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law
Collides With Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 33, 35 (2001) ("One of the fundamental
axioms of mediation is the importance of confidentiality.").
4 Id. at41.
5 See id; see also Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privi-
leges, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 9 (2001); Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be
All Wrong: Why the UMA 's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceedings
Should be Embraced and Broadened, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 135; Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing
Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private
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proceedings. This criticism has apparently sparked a debate pitting the funda-
mental goal of enforcing mediated agreements on one side, and the goal of fos-
tering an effective process for reaching those agreements on the other.
7
Specifically, the debate addresses the difficult balance between preserv-
ing the confidentiality of the mediation process and allowing access to the use of
mediator testimony when it would aid in the enforcement of mediated agree-
ments. On one side of the argument, confidentiality advocates argue that media-
tor testimony should play no role at all in agreement enforcement proceedings.8
This approach is concerned with preserving the informal nature, neutrality, and
open communication central to the mediation process. 9 On the other side, advo-
cates of applying traditional contract law to agreement enforcement proceedings
argue that courts should have access to all pertinent information when ruling on
the validity of mediated agreements. 10 In other words, this argument calls for an
exception to mediation confidentiality when the testimony of a mediator might
constitute a valuable asset to a court's ability to decipher the truth."I In re-
sponse, the debate forces a balancing of the type and magnitude of harm from
compelling the mediator to testify against the harm that would result if the me-
diator's testimony were not accessible in an enforcement proceeding. 
12
As mediation continues to gain popularity, it becomes increasingly im-
portant to define the degree to which rules of privilege protect mediation confi-
dentiality. Due to inconsistency throughout the country, a mediator is currently
unable to guarantee that he or she will keep everything said in a mediation ses-
sion confidential if a dissatisfied participant later subpoenas a mediator to tes-
6 See Deason, supra note 3, at 90-96; Hughes, supra note 5, at 64-77; Robinson, supra note 5,
at 171-73.
7 See Deason, supra note 3, at 35-36.
8 Many scholars view a broad mediator testimonial privilege as a necessary ingredient to the
mediation process. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in
Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 37, 40-45 (1986); Eileen P.
Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor Disputes, 11 CAP. U. L. REV.
181, 196-212 (1981); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transformation from Theory to
Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the
Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DiSp. RESOL. 1, 15-20.
9 See Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish Con-
sistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 79-85 (2001) ("[T]he challenge of
communicating with an adversary, the presence of a neutral intermediary, and the potential for
information informally reaching a judge all make confidentiality especially important for media-
tion.").
10 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 149-60.
11 See id.
12 See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (introducing
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tify. 13 However, in West Virginia, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
recently offered some much needed guidance in the case Riner v. Newbraugh.
14
In Riner, the court provides some indirect criticism concerning the use of media-
tor testimony, which in turn clarifies that in West Virginia state courts mediator
confidentiality will continue to take precedence in future agreement enforce-
ment proceedings. 
15
This Comment addresses the continuing development of law regarding
the place of mediator testimony in the enforcement of mediated agreements.
16
Part II addresses the importance of confidentiality to the mediation process.
Part III discusses the role of traditional contract law principles in the enforce-
ment of mediated agreements and the possible advantages of allowing mediator
testimony in this enforcement. Next, Part IV offers some examples of the dif-
ferent approaches used by various jurisdictions throughout the country. Finally,
Part V examines West Virginia law and breaks down how the Riner opinion
may provide some much needed consistency for the future of mediation in this
state.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE MEDIATION
PROCESS
Mediation is generally defined as "an informal, non-adversarial process
whereby a neutral third person, the mediator, assists disputing parties to resolve
by agreement or examine some or all of the differences between them."'17 In
13 See Deason, supra note 3, at 102 ("Parties are currently hampered in predicting confidenti-
ality by huge variations among jurisdictions in the form and scope of both protections for media-
tion confidentiality and contract doctrine for settlement enforcement."). It should be noted that in
order to provide a little security, some mediators require a signed contract from the participants
stating that the participants will not call the mediator as a witness under any circumstances. Inter-
view with Debra Scudiere, Kay Casto & Chaney PLLC, in Morgantown, W. Va. (Dec. 10, 2003).
However, these contracts do not necessarily create judicially-recognized protection. See Paul
Dayton Johnson, Jr., Note and Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation: What can Florida Glean
from the Uniform Mediation Act?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 487, 490 (2003). Courts have often
held similar confidentiality agreements unenforceable as a matter of public policy. See id.
14 563 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 2002).
is Id. at 808-09.
16 Four authors whose contributions to the topic of mediation have greatly benefited the author
are Ellen E. Deason (See supra notes 3 and 9), Scott H. Hughes (See supra note 5), Madeleine H.
Johnson (Student Work, What's a Mediator to Do? Adopting Ethical Guidelines for West Virginia
Mediators, 106 W. VA. L. RnV. 177 (2003)), and Peter Robinson (See supra note 5).
17 W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.02; see also UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § (2)(1) (2001), available at
http://www.law.upenn.eduibll/ulc/mediat/UMA200l.htm ("Mediation means a process in which a
mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a
voluntary agreement regarding their dispute."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining "mediation" as "[a] method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving a neutral third
party who tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution").
[Vol. 107
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defining the role of the mediator, the West Virginia rule states, "[t]he role of the
mediator is to encourage and assist the parties to reach their own mutually ac-
ceptable resolution by facilitating communication, helping to clarify issues and
interests, identifying what additional information should be collected or ex-
changed, fostering joint problem-solving, exploring resolution alternatives, and
other similar means." 18 Naturally, the concept of confidentiality is regarded as
fundamental to the preservation of the "informal, non-adversarial" nature of the
mediation process that enables the mediator to perform these crucial functions.
Specifically, confidentiality provides three main safeguards for preserving the
crucial mediation atmosphere: (1) it ensures that parties view mediation proce-
dures separately from judicial procedures; (2) it maintains the "neutrality" of the
mediator; and (3) it encourages effective communication among the various• . 19
participants.
A. Distinguishing Mediation Procedures From Judicial Procedures
First, in order for the participants to view mediation as an "informal,
non-adversarial" process, it is imperative that mediation be distinguished from
normal judicial procedure. In contrast to adjudication, "mediation is essentially
a form of negotiation."2 0 The parties retain the power to shape the agenda for
discussion, and any agreement reached is done so voluntarily through party self-.- 21
determination. Unlike a judge, a mediator acts primarily as a
catalyst for this process; he cannot compel the production of in-
formation, and he does not render judgment by applying preor-
dained rules to the dispute after hearing reasoned argument. In-
stead, he helps the parties reach agreement by identifying is-
sues, exploring possible bases for agreement and the conse-
quences of not settling, and encouraging each party to accom-
modate the interests of other parties.
Indeed, mediation needs to be viewed as a consensual process in which
the disputing parties decide the resolution of their dispute themselves, as op-
1S W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.02.
19 See Deason, supra note 9, at 79-85.
20 Note, See Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 443 (December
1984).
21 See id at 444; see also Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith"
Reports Under the Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation
Tent, 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 67, 80-82.
22 Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 444.
2004]
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posed to having a ruling imposed upon them by a stranger.23 As various schol-
ars have noted, mediation, unlike litigation, empowers the disputants.24 Thus, in
order to promote successful mediation, the participants must understand that
mediation offers a unique problem solving structure that ordinary civil litigation
does not.
Confidentiality aids the non-adversarial atmosphere of mediation by
"keeping the judging function separate from the mediation function." 25 In other
words, without the assurances of confidentiality, parties may fear that their con-
versations with the mediator could be conveyed informally to the trier of fact.
26
This problem is multiplied if the parties face a bench trial in the event that they
fail to settle their suit.27 For instance, if mediator testimony were allowed in
subsequent proceedings, participants might feel as though the judge will rely on
the mediator's account of the settlement attempt too heavily. This fear effec-
tively cloaks the mediator with an unfair sense of "settlement coercion," which
is contrary to the voluntary nature of the mediation process. Confidentiality
ensures participants that a mediator is not performing judge-like analysis,
thereby guaranteeing that an unsuccessful mediation attempt will not come back
to haunt either side of the dispute.
B. Maintaining Mediator Neutrality
Confidentiality also serves a second very important function by defining
the mediator's role as a neutral, non-aligned participant. 29 The appearance and
reality of mediator neutrality are "essential to generating the climate of trust
necessary for effective mediation." 30 Without mediator neutrality, participants
would show reluctance to participate in mediation, mainly because participants
will only confide in a mediator who does not appear to be partisan or in a posi-
tion to serve other interests.
31
23 See Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (N.Y. 1993) (recog-
nizing a societal benefit from the parties shaping their own agreement rather than having one
judicially imposed).
24 See, e.g., Izumi & La Rue, supra note 21, at 81; Thompson, supra note 5, at 510.
25 Deason, supra note 9, at 83.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 21, at 82.
29 See, e.g., Deason, supra note 9, at 82-83.
3D Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 446.
31 See Deason, supra note 3, at 36-37.
[Vol. 107
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Requiring mediator testimony in court proceedings poses a danger of
undermining the parties' confidence in the mediator's impartiality. 32 If media-
tors were required to testify about their activities, "not even the strictest adher-
ence to purely factual matters would prevent the evidence from favoring or
seeming to favor one side or the other." Additionally, a mediator has a finan-
cial interest in preserving neutrality because a biased reputation might jeopard-
ize the ability of the mediator to present himself as a neutral party in the fu-
ture.34 In turn, members of the local legal community are unlikely to seek the
mediator's services in future conflicts. These concerns have led at least one
court to refuse mediator testimony solely on the grounds that it would inhibit
future "mediator effectiveness." 
35
C. Encouraging Effective Communication
A third advantage of providing confidentiality in the mediation process,- 36
and perhaps the most important, is the fostering of open communication. Re-
member that the roles of the mediator often include facilitating communication,
helping to clarify issues and interests, identifying what additional information
should be collected or exchanged, fostering joint problem-solving, and explor-
ing settlement alternatives. 37 In order for the mediator to achieve these goals,
the participants must approach a mediation session with candor, or a disposition
of open-mindedness. 38 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explained:
If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of eve-
rything that transpires during [mediation] sessions then counsel
of necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a
cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to
32 See id- at 37.
33 Id. (quoting Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 688 (1947)).
34 See Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 446, 455-56; see also
Hughes, supra note 5, at 37 ("The consequences will usually occur after the completion of the
mediation and so any negative impact on the perceived impartiality will not be detrimental to a
mediator vis-d-vis one-time disputants, but may adversely affect a mediator who works in a small
community or is frequently employed by the same parties.").
35 See NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an important
public policy underlying an independent mediator privilege for labor mediation is the preservation
of "mediator effectiveness").
36 See generally Deason, supra note 9, at 80.
37 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
38 In other words, mediation's dispute-resolving capabilities thrive upon the parties feeling as
though they can be frank or open with the mediator. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 5, at 565.
2004]
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poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempt-
ing to arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute. This atmos-
phere if allowed to exist would surely destroy the effectiveness
of [the] program ....39
Confidentiality discourages this "poker player" attitude by ensuring the privacy
of conversations between the parties and the mediator.
To illustrate, confidentiality becomes particularly important when me-
diators try to get parties to discuss the aspects of their case in private caucuses.
In order for mediation to be successful, "the parties must feel sure that anything
said in private caucus with the mediator is as confidential as they desire.
Without confidentiality, participants would refuse to disclose the possible
strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions out of fear that they might
be communicated to the other side, or, even worse, to a judge or jury at a later
court appearance. This cautious behavior would certainly prove detrimental to
the settlement of the dispute.
Along these same lines, confidentiality "serves to protect the mediation
program from being used as a discovery tool for creative attomeys." 41 "Without
adequate legal protection, a party's candor in mediation might well be 're-
warded' by a discovery request or the revelation of mediation information at
trial."4 2 Confidentiality ensures that parties are free to explore settlement possi-
bilities without worrying about the courtroom advantages that the other side
might gain if their exploration does not succeed.
43
In sum, confidentiality helps to achieve an informal and non-adversarial
process by distinguishing the mediation process from the judicial process, main-
taining the neutrality of the mediator, and encouraging open communication
among the various participants. Accordingly, it is not surprising that confidenti-
ality is regarded as an essential component to the mediation phenomenon. In
fact, state legislatures have enacted numerous statutes and rules creating a vari-
ety of privile es and protections for communications made during mediation
proceedings. In addition, all federal district courts and courts of appeals offer
mediation programs protected by confidentiality. 45 However, as discussed be-
39 Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979).
40 See Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 454.
41 In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 636 (4th Cir. 2002).
42 Id. (quoting Kirtley, supra note 8, at 9-10).
43 See, e.g., Deason, supra note 9, at 81.
44 See infra Part IV.A.; see also SARAH R. COLE ET. AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE apps. A and B (2d ed. Supp. 2003); Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak
No Evil: The Intolerable Conflictfor Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REv. 715 app.
45 See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 107
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low, the various protections offered under these confidentiality provisions differ
substantially.
46
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR AN "AGREEMENT ENFORCEMENT" EXCEPTION TO
THE MEDIATOR PRIVILEGE
Despite overwhelming agreement over the importance of confidentiality
in the mediation process, some jurisdictions create exceptions that allow media-
tor testimony during the enforcement of disputed mediated agreements. 47 The
rationale is simple: What good does a confidential mediation process do if you
cannot effectively enforce the outcome of that process? As a result, some sug-
gest that confidentiality should yield to a "demonstrable need for parol evidence
when one of the parties to a mediation agreement sues to enforce or rescind that
agreement.
' 'A8
A. The Role of Contract Law in the Mediation Process
Clearly, the underlying goal behind mediation is to resolve disputes and
achieve settlements. When a court enforces a mediated agreement, it is affirm-
ing the effectiveness of the mediation process and reinforcing the participants'
incentives to mediate. 49 Thus, appropriate enforcement "encourage[s] parties in
the future to take mediations seriously, to understand that they represent real
opportunities to reach closure and avoid trial, and to attend carefully to terms of
agreements proposed in mediations." 50 Traditional contract law principles en-
sure that mediated agreements are treated and enforced as real contracts, thereby
protecting them from vulnerability. 51 Moreover, traditional contract law incor-
porates centuries of experience helpful in determining the true character of these
agreements.52 For example, contract law helps define the conditions necessary
for: the formation of a binding agreement; declaring a binding agreement void
based on public policy; the meanings of the specific terms of a binding agree-
ment; the effect of performance and nonperformance; impracticability of per-
formance and frustration of purpose; and assignment, delegation, or novation.
53
46 See infra Part IV.
47 See infra Part IV.B.
48 Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 452.
49 See Deason, supra note 3, at 37.
so Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
51 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 148 ("The law of contracts consists of the collection of re-
quirements that define when a commitment rises to the level of triggering legal enforceability.").
52 See id.
53 Id. at 149-59 (providing a thorough analysis of contract law's application in these situa-
20041
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Another value to keep in mind is the "fundamental understanding of
mediation as a consensual process." 54 Although mediation is an informal pro-
cedure, parties are still allowed to assert common-law defenses such as fraud,
duress, lack of capacity, or any other claim that may invalidate consent to an
agreement. Traditional contract law ensures the validity of the mediation
process by providing a forum for disgruntled parties to void contracts entered
into without consent. Thus, traditional contract law advances the important in-
terests of mediation by providing a framework for enforcing valid settlement
agreements and embodying society's views of appropriate consent.
56
B. Should Mediator Testimony Play a Role in the Application of Tradi-
tional Contract Law?
While traditional contract law obviously has a place in the enforcement
of mediated agreements, the role of mediator testimony in these time-honored
contract principles is not as clear. Some commentators argue that excluding
mediator testimony from enforcement proceedings has the effect of excluding
valuable parol evidence essential to a court's ability to decipher the truth.
This, it is argued, violates the modem contract approach of using a "totality of
the circumstances" when deciphering settlement agreements.
58
Specifically, it is arguable that the exemption of mediators from subse-
quent enforcement proceedings has the effect of excluding meaningful informa-
tion from the only possible "neutral" witness to the agreement. For example,
when a party is not permitted to introduce evidence from the "neutral" observer,
a party may be hard pressed to prove an alleged defect, such as a missing term
or invalid consent, in the mediated agreement. 59 With this in mind, one com-
mentator has suggested that a ban on mediator testimony might interfere with
tions).
54 See Deason, supra note 3, at 38.
55 See id; see also FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999). For an over-
view of the issues associated with applying these "appropriate consent" principles to the mediation
context, see Thompson, supra note 5, at 527-39.
56 See Deason, supra note 3, at 37-38 ("Thus traditional contract law, which provides a
framework for enforcing properly reached agreements and refusing to enforce invalid agreements,
distills important interests that apply in the context of mediation as well as in other contract set-
tings.").
57 See supra notes 10- 11 and accompanying text.
58 In interpreting contracts, "courts have looked well beyond information within the four cor-
ners of a settlement document, examining factors regarding the parties and their representatives,
the attitude of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances of the negotiations leading up to the
settlement." Robinson, supra note 5, at 150.
59 See Thompson, supra note 5, at 523 (arguing that "there is a type of presumption that as-
sumes the validity and enforceability of settlement agreements ending litigation").
[Vol. 107
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the application of contract law in at least the following circumstances: (1) con-
flicting factual testimony by the parties; (2) mediations with a prevalence of
private meetings; and (3) complex multi-party mediations.
60
1. Conflicting Factual Testimony Between the Parties
First, hearings about whether a particular issue was discussed at a me-
diation session or disputes over an alleged clerical error in a written mediation
agreement might result in conflicting testimony between the parties. Without
mediator testimony, a court will most likely decide the case by finding one wit-
ness more credible than the other or that there is no agreement because of a lack
of mutual assent.6 1 In this situation, allowing mediator testimony might provide
a valuable alternative to either of these drastic measures.
2. Mediations with a Prevalence of Private Meetings
Second, since mediators commonly use private caucuses with each
party, "the negotiations and discussions often critical to the application of con-
tract law occur between the mediator and a party and/or party's attorney."
62
Simply stated, "[e]ven the most honest party may have a skewed perspective
and will be hard pressed toXrovide an objective characterization of his conver-
sations with the mediator." Moreover, "[l]ess scrupulous parties could offer
unrebuttable exaggerated testimony." 64 In turn, the absence of mediator testi-
mony may force a trier of fact to accept false, unrebutted testimony as the truth.
Thus, the availability of the mediator's account may provide a safeguard against
any skewed testimony by a mediation participant.
3. Complex Multi-Party Mediations
Third, it is arguable that mediator testimony may be indispensable in
complex multi-party mediations. To illustrate, some mass tort cases involve
hundreds of parties represented by numerous attorneys. 65 Sometimes, these
mediations go on for several days and consist of several different meetings with
different categories of participants. 66 Thus, one may argue that there are in-
60 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 172-73.
61 Id. at 172. Ironically, this was the exact result in Riner v. Newbraugh. 563 S.E.2d 802, 809
(W. Va. 2002).
62 Robinson, supra note 5, at 172.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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stances where only the mediator knows the information critical to the enforce-
ment analysis. 67 If mediator testimony is not allowed in complex multi-party
cases, problems may arise since the mediator is the only person who knows of
each individual party's commitment. As a result, only the account of the party
attempting to renege on the agreement will be admissible, and these mediated
settlement agreements will become vulnerable contracts. 68 In other words, one
party may invalidate an otherwise valid and enforceable contract by simply ex-
pressing some type of dissatisfaction (i.e., "I never agreed to that!"). Without
mediator testimony, it may become difficult to prove the exact terms of these
complex agreements.
In sum, critics of a strict mediator privilege argue that it interferes with
an unfettered application of contract law. As a result, various jurisdictions are
unsure as to whether the possible contributions of mediator testimony outweigh
the interests surrounding mediator confidentiality.
IV. A LOOK AT VARIOUS APPROACHES USED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
A. Jurisdictions Refusing to Allow Mediator Testimony About Mediation
Communications in Agreement Enforcement Proceedings
Although mediator testimony might provide a valuable contribution to
agreement enforcement proceedings, many jurisdictions still maintain a strict
mediator privilege in relation to the communications made during the mediation.
1. State Statutory Law
First, most states make no specific exception to their confidentiality pro-
tections for the purpose of enforcing a mediated settlement agreement. Some of
these protect confidentiality through comprehensive evidentiary exclusions,
while others provide protection through specific statutes that govern media-
tion.69 For example, the West Virginia Trial Court Rules specifically prohibit a
mediator from testifying about confidential communications in any dispute aris-
ing out of a mediated agreement. 70 Similar language is found in the statutes and
rules of Alabama,7 1 Alaska,72 Indiana,73 Nevada, 74 New Jersey, 75 North Caro-
67 "An example is when a mediator amalgamates confidential contributions from a group of
defendants for a global settlement." Id In these types of situations, it is imperative that each
defendant's contribution remains confidential during the mediation process since the other parties
may become irritated if they knew the exact contributions of certain defendants. Id.
68 Id.
69 See Deason, supra note 3, at 39-40.
70 See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
71 See ALA. CIV. CT. MEDIATION R. 1 (d) ("A mediator shall not be compelled in any adver-
sary proceeding or judicial forum, including, but not limited to, a hearing on sanctions brought by
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lina,76 South Carolina,77 and Vermont.78 Other states create mediator privileges
that do provide specific exceptions, but refrain from making any type of excep-
tion for agreement enforcement proceedings.7 9 As a result, many jurisdictions
have found a way to apply common-law contract law principles without the use
of mediator testimony."u
one party against another party, to divulge the contents of documents received, viewed, or drafted
during mediation or the fact that such documents exist nor shall the mediator be otherwise com-
pelled to testify in regard to statements made, actions taken, or positions stated by a party during
the mediation."); see also ALA. APP. CT. MEDIATION R. 8.
72 See ALASKA R. Civ. PRoc. 100(g) ("The mediator shall not testify as to any aspect of the
mediation proceedings.").
73 See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-27(a) (Michie 2003) ("A mediator is not subject to proc-
ess requiring disclosure of any matter discussed during the mediation.").
74 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109(3) (Michie 2003) ("A mediator is not subject to civil
process requiring the disclosure of any matter discussed during the mediation proceedings.").
75 See N.J. CT. R. 1:40-4(c) ("No mediator may participate in any subsequent hearing or trial
of the mediated matter or appear as witness or counsel for any person in the same or any related
matter.").
76 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-110(b) (2004) (No mediator shall be compelled to testify or pro-
duce evidence in any civil proceeding concerning statements made and conduct occurring in a
mediation ....").
77 See S.C. CIR. CT. ADR R. 8(e) ("The mediator shall not be compelled by subpoena or oth-
erwise to divulge any records or to testify in regard to the mediation in any adversary proceeding
or judicial forum.").
78 See VT. R. EviD. 501(b)(3) (recognizing a statutory privilege for communications made to a
"mediator, factfinder or arbitrator during a labor dispute or negotiation.").
79 See CAL. EvID. CODE § 703.5 (West 2003) (creating an exception only in contempt, crimi-
nal, or disciplinary proceedings); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3)-(4) (West 2003) (creating an ex-
ception only for mediator disciplinary proceedings); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014(2) (West 2003)
(creating an exception only for otherwise discoverable information); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1805(F) (West 2003) (creating an exception only for actions against the mediator); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-19-44(b) (2003) (creating an exception only for collective bargaining agreements); GA.
ADR RULE 7(b) (creating an exception only where there are threats of violence, child abuse, third
party danger, and claims brought against a mediator or third party); MD. R. 17-109(c)-(d) (creating
an exception only where there is a signed writing providing otherwise, there is a threat of serious
bodily harm or death, or there is an allegation of mediator misconduct).
80 See, e.g., Stempel v. Stempel, 633 So.2d 26, 26-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (approving a
"bare bones" mediation agreement mainly because there was no proof that the parties agreed to
any other terms); Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001) (invalidating a mediated
settlement agreement without breaching confidentiality on the basis that there was no "meeting of
the minds"); Montanaro v. Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. App. 1997) (upholding a medi-
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2. Confidentiality Protection at the Federal Level
At the federal level, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 re-
quires confidentiality protection in all district court-sponsored ADR programs,
81
although a clear national standard has yet to develop.8 2 Similarly, the circuit
courts of appeal also offer mediation programs at the appellate level, all of
which provide for confidentiality. 83 As for the executive branch, each federal
agency is required to provide ADR techniques that promote confidentiality pro-
tections. 84 However, the executive branch does have a "manifest injustice" ex-
ception to its confidentiality protections for mediators, which is discussed be-
low.
85
3. The Uniform Mediation Act
In 2001, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL")86 incorporated a strict privilege for mediator testimony into
the new Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA"). 87 The UMA was passed with an eye
toward unifying the law of mediation confidentiality throughout the United
States.88 While the Act calls for a privilege of confidentiality for communica-
tions made during a mediation,8 9 section 6(b)(2) creates a "substantially out-
81 See 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2000).
82 Compare Willis v. McGraw, 177 F.R.D. 632, 633 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (issuing a statement
refusing to involve itself in any way "in sorting out disagreements amongst the parties emanating
from the mediation process"), with FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
("The Court does not read the ADRA or its sparse legislative history as creating an evidentiary
privilege that would preclude a litigant from challenging the validity of a settlement agreement
based on events that transpired at a mediation.").
83 See Deason, supra note 3, at 40.
84 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2000); see also Confidentiality
in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 83,085 (Dec. 29, 2000).
85 See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
86 NCCUSL is now in its 112th year. The organization comprises more than 300 lawyers,
judges and law professors, appointed by the states as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands, to draft proposals for uniform and model laws on subjects where
uniformity is desirable and practicable, and work toward their enactment in legislatures. For more
information, see www.nccusl.org.
87 The UMA, drafted in collaboration with the American Bar Association's Section on Dispute
Resolution, establishes a privilege of confidentiality for mediators and participants. UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT § 4 (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/UMA200l .htm.
It was approved by the ABA in 2002. Id.
88 See Michael B. Getty et al., Preface to Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation
Act, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 787, 787 (1998).
89 See UNIFORM MEDITATION ACT § 4.
[Vol. 107
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/13
RINER v. NE WBRA UGH
weighs" exception for testimony in subsequent agreement enforcement proceed-
ings by the parties to a mediation. 90 In justification of the exception, the com-
ments state, "[t]his exception is designed to preserve traditional contract de-
fenses to the enforcement of the mediated settlement agreement that relate to the
integrity of the mediation process, which otherwise would be unavailable if
based on mediation communications."9 1 It is important to note that this excep-
tion is much broader than the exceptions currently allowed in most states.
92
However, section 6(c) declares that this "substantially outweighs" ex-
ception is inapplicable to mediator testimony.93 While the section does allow
the mediator to voluntarily testify, he or she may not be compelled to do so.94
Although the Act's distinction between participant testimony and mediator tes-
timony has been openly criticized,95 the Act's adoption of a strict privilege for
mediator testimony illustrates a substantial trend toward creating a national
norm that exempts a mediator from testifying.
9 6
B. Jurisdictions Allowing Mediator Testimony About Mediation Communi-
cations in Certain Agreement Enforcement Proceedings
Despite the substantial authority advocating the use of a strict mediator
privilege, the law is far from consistent. For example, the Fourth Circuit re-
90 See id. at § 6(b)(2). Specifically,
[t]here is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or arbitra-
tor finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the propo-
nent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that
there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protect-
ing confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is sought or offered in:.
. (2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim
to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the
mediation.
Id.
91 Id. at § 6(b)(2) cmt. 11.
92 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 170.
93 "A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication
referred to in subsection ... (b)(2)." UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(c).
94 See id.
95 See Deason, supra note 3, at 90-91; Hughes, supra note 5, at 64-66; Robinson, supra note 5,
at 171-72.
96 Although the UMA is barely two years old, it has already been adopted by Illinois, H.B.
2146, 93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (ll. 2003), and Nebraska, L.B. 255, 98th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2003), and is currently on the agenda in many other states. For a good discussion of the UMA and
some suggestions to state legislatures for integrating the UMA into their laws, see Richard C.
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cently stated in dicta that mediator testimony is required if it is mandated by
"manifest injustice" and is indispensable to the resolution of a subsequent dis-
pute.97 In addition, federal agency law requires mediator testimony if a court
determines that such testimony is necessary to prevent a "manifest injustice."
98
Similarly, a few states have created statutory exceptions that take a case-by-case
approach in deciding whether a breach of the general confidentiality rules is
necessary to resolve a subsequent dispute. 99 Moreover, some state statutes al-
low very broad exceptions to mediator confidentiality after an agreement is
reached.100  Advocates of these case-by-case approaches point out how they
grant courts considerable flexibility while at the same time limiting mediation
disclosures "in order to keep them rare."101 Of course, a possible disadvantage
of these approaches is unpredictability and inconsistency.'
0 2
There is also evidence of courts creating judicially implied exceptions to
mediator confidentiality. For example, the current status of California's confi-
dentiality statute is unclear due to a few recent cases creating implied excep-
tions. t°  In North Carolina, one party's claim that mediation resulted in a set-
97 In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 640 (4th Cir. 2002).
98 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4)(A) (2000).
99 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (West 2003) (requiring mediator testimony if
"[a] judicial determination of the meaning or enforceability of an agreement resulting from a
mediation procedure if the court determines that testimony concerning what occurred in the me-
diation proceeding is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.023(C)(4) (West 2003) (compelling disclosure if the information is necessary to prevent a
manifest injustice that outweighs the importance of confidentiality); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
904.085(4)(e) (West 2002) ("In an action or proceeding distinct from the dispute whose settlement
is attempted through mediation, the court may admit evidence otherwise barred by this section if
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of
protecting the principle of confidentiality in mediation proceedings generally."); KY. MEDIATION
R. 12(C) (allowing mediator testimony about any matter discussed during the mediation if a party
obtains an "order of the Court for good cause shown").
100 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-235d(b) (West 2003) (allowing the disclosure of media-
tion communications where they are "necessary to enforce a written agreement that came out of
the mediation"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.2(7) (West 2004) (creating an exception to confidenti-
ality "'[w]hen a mediation communication or mediation document is relevant to determining the
existence of an agreement that resulted from the mediation or is relevant to the enforcement of
such an agreement"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(c)(v) (Michie 2003) (recognizing no media-
tion privilege where "[o]ne of the parties seeks judicial enforcement of the mediated agreement").
101 See Deason, supra note 3, at 48.
102 See id.
103 See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1133-39 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (creating
an implied exception when one party asserts the contract defense of undue influence); Rinaker v.
Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (1998) (creating an implied exception to the statute
based upon protecting a "due process right" to cross examine a witness in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding). But see Foxgate Homeowners' Assn. v. Bramalca Cal. Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1125-26
(Cal. 2001) (declaring that implied exceptions to mediation confidentiality are invalid due to the
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tlement shown by an unsigned agreement led a state court to hear testimony
from a mediator. 10 The court did this in spite of statutory confidentiality pro-
tections because, in the court's view, state contract law governing oral contracts
trumped the protections.
In a Texas federal case, a mediation participant claimed that fraud had
tainted the mediation process. 106 In spite of an ironclad statute protecting me-
diation confidentiality, the judge decided to weigh the public policy reasons
favoring the privilege against the defendant's interest in having the mediator
testify.107  Although the mediator's subpoena was ultimately quashed, the
judge's analysis "may have threatened confidentiality more generally by creat-
ing new limits to the protection afforded by the statute.
'" 10 8
Recently, a Texas state court added to the confusion surrounding its
mediation confidentiality protection by creating a judicial exception in a legal
malpractice case. 10 9 In that case, the plaintiff sued his former lawyer alleging
that the lawyer failed to adequately warn him of the consequences of accepting a
proposed settlement agreement. i When the lawyer tried to subpoena the me-
diator for relevant testimony, the plaintiff objected on confidentiality
grounds.III The trial court did not allow the mediator testimony on the basis of
one of Texas's confidentiality statutes. 112 On appeal, the Texas Court of Ap-
peals reversed on the basis of a common law "offensive use" doctrine. 113 Basi-
cally, the Court held that since the plaintiff sought affirmative relief from his
former attorney, and since the mediator was the only witness to the disputed
conversation, the mediator's testimony was required since it was outcome de-
terminative.
1t 4
clear and unambiguous language of the statute).
104 See Few v. Hammack Enter., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665, 670 (N.C. 1999) ("[A] mediator is both
competent and compellable to testify or produce evidence on whether the parties reached a settle-
ment agreement, and as to the terms of the agreement, where the judge is making that determina-
tion.").
105 Id. at 669-70; see also Deason, supra note 3, at 36.
106 See Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
107 Id at 670-75.
lo Deason, supra note 3, at 71.
109 See Alford v. Bryant, 137 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App. 2004).
110 Id. at 918.
I Id. at 919.
112 Id.
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Finally, approximately half the states lack a comprehensive mediation
statute, which leads to "a patchwork of protections" made up of one or more of
the above approaches. 115 Thus, mediator confidentiality is still faced with a
crippling inconsistency across the country.
V. A LOOK AT WEST VIRGINIA
Until recently, West Virginia had yet to become involved in the ensuing
debate over the place of mediator testimony in agreement enforcement proceed-
ings. While the West Virginia Trial Court Rules clearly call for a strict mediator
privilege, 116 it was still unclear as to whether a judicially implied exception,
similar to those used in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, California, North
Carolina, and Texas would surface in West Virginia case law. 117 However, in
Riner v. Newbraugh,118 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indirectly
addressed the issue and took a stance.
A. Evidence of a Possible Conflict in the West Virginia Trial Court Rules
West Virginia has long used a strict mediator privilege, which states:
Mediation shall be regarded as confidential settlement negotia-
tions, subject to W. Va. R.Evid. 408. A mediator shall maintain
and preserve the confidentiality of all mediation proceedings
and records. A mediator shall keep confidential from opposing
parties information obtained in an individual session unless the
party to that session or the party's counsel authorizes disclosure.
A mediator may not be subpoenaed or called to testify or oth-
erwise be subject to process requiring disclosure of confidential
information in any proceeding relating to or arising out of the
dispute mediated.
1 19
Thus, the plain language of the rule appears to prohibit mediator testi-• • 120
mony in nearly every circumstance. However, West Virginia also uses tradi-tional contract law to enforce mediated agreements through West Virginia Trial
H5 Deason, supra note 3, at 50.
116 See W.VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.12.
117 See supra notes 97, 103-14 and accompanying text.
118 563 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 2002).
119 W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.12.
120 There is evidence that a mediator is permitted to testify as to general questions about
whether an agreement was reached at mediation, but the questioning is very limited. See Riner,
563 S.E.2d at 808 n.8.
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Court Rule 25.14, which states, "[i]f the parties reach a settlement and execute a
written agreement, the agreement is enforceable in the same manner as any• ,,1 21 . .
other written contract. The possibility of an inherent conflict between these
rules raises the issue of mediator testimony's proper place in agreement en-
forcement disputes. On one hand, one rule advocates for maintaining total con-
fidentiality for the mediator. On the other hand, another rule concerns itself
with the effective enforcement of mediated agreements, which in turn leads to
the difficult question of whether a court should require mediator testimony when
it might provide valuable parol evidence.
B. Riner v. Newbraugh
Despite the various arguments endorsing mediator testimony in en-
forcement proceedings, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indicates
in Riner v. Newbraugh that total confidentiality surrounding mediator testimony
is still the governing standard in West Virginia.
122
1. Facts and Procedural History
Riner involved a dispute over the enforcement of a settlement agree-
ment reached as a result of a court-ordered mediation. 23 The dispute arose over
the development of a piece of farmland into a subdivision. 24 The Riners, own-
ers of the land subject to dispute, filed a civil action in circuit court alleging
fraud and a breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant build-
ers/developers. 125 Although the parties first participated in an unsuccessful
court-ordered mediation, the continuing efforts of the mediator and participants
eventually led to an agreement. 126 The mediator reduced the agreement to writ-
ing, and both he and the Riners signed. 127 The two-page agreement was then
transferred to the defendants, who chose not to sign the agreement. 128 Instead,
the defendants prepared a lengthier document that restated certain provisions of
the original agreement, but also added certain provisions not specifically ad-
dressed at the mediation conference.
1 29
121 W.VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.14.
122 Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 808-09.
123 Id. at 805.
124 Id. at 804.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 805.
127 Id. at 804-05.
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When the Riners refused to sign the new agreement, the defendants filed
a motion to enforce. The defendants argued that the added provisions not
discussed at the mediation conference were impliedly included in the settlement
agreement. 13 1 Two hearings were held on the issue at which testimony was
offered by the Riners' former counsel, the defendants' counsel, Mr. Riner, and
the mediator. 32 The testimony of the mediator consisted of the following:
THE COURT: There obviously has been a release prepared be-
yond the date of the settlement agreement in the case. The par-
ties are alleging, primarily the Plaintiffs . . ., that certain terms
within the settlement agreement and releases go beyond the
pale, go beyond the original agreement that was dated the 5th
day of September of 2000, and either embrace new material or
work a greater or different settlement than envisioned in your
September 5th document, you're aware of that?
THE WITNESS: I am aware of that.
THE COURT: You are unaware of any particulars as to what
alleged maybe [sic] larger ambit of the proposed settlement
agreement release that was prepared by the Defendants?
THE WITNESS: I am guessing because I know what the nature
of the lawsuit was, essentially involved dissolution of a business
entity existing between the Newbraughs and the Riners. Be-
cause of that I anticipated there was going to be probably a
pretty substantial release that both sides were going to want to
make sure that neither one of them could throw rocks at them in
the future. 
133
The circuit court, relying heavily on the mediator's testimony, found
that any agreement between the parties was meant to "insure a clean break.'"
134
Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that it could "find no substantive area of
disagreement or misunderstanding that was not resolved by the [mediation set-
tlement] Agreement, which appears to the Court to be a valid, fair and enforce-
130 Id.
131 Id. at 808.
132 Id. at 805.
133 Id. at 808.
134 Id. ("The trial court, in making its ruling, obviously relied upon the mediator's testimony.").
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able settlement agreement."' 135 Thus, the Riners were subsequently ordered to
sign the defendants' version of the agreement.
136
2. Holding
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and
invalidated the agreement on the basis that there was no "meeting of the minds,"
which is an essential element to all valid contracts. 137 Interestingly, although
neither party raised concern over the testimony of the mediator, the court went
out of its way to express its disapproval with the use of mediator testimony in
these types of proceedings. Specifically, the court stated:
While the trial court's questioning of the mediator ensued due
to his presence having been secured by subpoena, we question
the wisdom of permitting the mediator to testify in the fashion
allowed in this case. To the mediator's credit, he informed the
trial court prior to his testimony that the trial court rules prohibit
him from subsequently testifying for trial purposes .... While
it does not appear that the mediator disclosed any confidential
information through his testimony, and neither party has raised
such a claim, the trial court's questioning of the mediator went
beyond the basic issue of whether in fact an agreement was
reached and identifying the terms of that agreement .... While
we do not approve of the trial court's entire line of questioning
of the mediator, we do not find a violation of TCR 25.12 due to
the non-disclosure by the mediator of confidential information
discussed during the mediation process.138
Although the court found no violation of the rule, its comments clearly signal
the court's disapproval of breaching mediator confidentiality in subsequent en-
forcement proceedings.
Interestingly, the court's holding suggests that mediators can testify on
the basic issue of whether an agreement was reached and the terms of that
agreement. Nonetheless, the court's criticism of the lower court proceedings
still indicates that specific questioning about the settlement process is off limits.
Thus, after Riner it appears that in West Virginia, at least for now, the media-
tor's confidentiality will take precedence in proceedings initiated to enforce
135 Id at 805.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 809.
138 Id. at 808-09.
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mediated agreements. 139 Moreover, reading the court's comments in this man-
ner provides some much needed consistency for the future of mediation in West
Virginia.
3. Possible Consequences
West Virginia's use of a strict mediator privilege results in at least two
main consequences to the mediation process. First, it appears that West Virginia
mediators may now tell their clients with reasonable confidence that they will
not be testifying as to any mediation communication at any subsequent state
court proceeding.14 0 This promotes the informality and candor that is so crucial
to the mediation process.141
Second, the unavailability of mediator testimony to a dissatisfied par-
ticipant illustrates the importance of setting out a clear, definite settlement
agreement in writing at the end of each successful mediation. Without the aid of
mediator testimony, the drafter of a settlement agreement needs to assure that
every term is adequately defined and discussed. 142 Due to these concerns, some
states have enacted mandatory writing requirements. 143 In fact, if confidential-
ity is going to continue to take precedence, a bright-line rule requiring a formal
signed writing may be the next step in the continuing development of West Vir-
ginia mediation law.
144
One possible downside to maintaining a strict mediator privilege is the
weakening of traditional contract law defenses such as fraud, duress, and mis-
take, all of which become much more difficult to prove without the aid of neu-
tral testimony. 145 In other words, the lack of mediator testimony may hamper
the ability of contract law to decipher whether a valid settlement agreement was
formed with the proper consent of the participants. After all, the Riner court did
139 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 167. See generally Johnson, supra note 16, at 190-9 1.
140 Things are still a little murky at the federal level due to the "manifest injustice" exception to
confidentiality adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, See supra note 98 and accompa-
nying text.
141 See supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
142 See Deason, supra note 3, at 75 ("Settling a lawsuit involves releasing rights that would
otherwise be pursued in court. This is a decision of significance, and a court's determination that
such an agreement was actually reached should be based on more than who wins the credibility
contest in a swearing match.").
143 Writing requirements vary in degree and complexity, and are outside the scope of this
Comment. However, for a good discussion of writing requirements, see Deason, supra note 3, at
5 1-60.
144 But see Thompson, supra note 5, at 551 (arguing that "technical, specialized rules in media-
tions such as a statute of frauds, that conflict with custom, practice, or reasonable expectations,
will create confusion, uncertainty, and litigation").
145 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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clarify that "we do recognize that the mediation process will only work while
the parties are ensured that the process is fair to both sides and where the at-, ,.146
tainment of settlement is viewed as non-compulsory. Therefore, the profes-
sionalism of both the mediator and the participants during the mediation is of
the utmost importance. 
147
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, as the practice of mediation continues to gain support
throughout the country, it becomes increasingly important to define the scope of
the confidentiality protections surrounding its communications. Currently, ju-
risdictions are having trouble deciding the proper role of mediator testimony in
the enforcement of mediated agreements. Some jurisdictions are continuing to
apply a strict mediator privilege, which allows a mediator to refuse from testify-
ing about mediation communications in any agreement enforcement proceeding.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions either offer only slight
protection for mediators or have now created broad exceptions that view media-
tor testimony as an essential element to a court's ability to decipher the truth
behind mediated agreements. Not surprisingly, several jurisdictions wind up
somewhere in the middle of these two extremes.
The ensuing debate over the proper role of mediator testimony in en-
forcement proceedings has led to a crippling inconsistency throughout the coun-
try. As a result, mediators are often unable to guarantee that they will keep eve-
rything said in a mediation session confidential if a dissatisfied participant later
becomes unhappy with an agreement and subpoenas mediator testimony.
Thankfully, the emergence of the Uniform Mediation Act and various judicially
implied exceptions should bring this topic some much-deserved attention.
In West Virginia, at least for now, the standard is set. Through its re-
cent opinion of Riner v. Newbraugh, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has indirectly supplied some much-needed guidance. After Riner, West
Virginia mediators may now perform their duties of solving problems and en-
couraging compromise without the threat of a future subpoena complicating the
process. However, the absence of neutral testimony will now place a greater
importance on the formality of settlement agreements and the professionalism of
the participants.
146 Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 810 (W. Va. 2002).
147 See Hughes, supra note 5, at 72-77 (explaining the "downside to confidentiality when it is
used to conceal negligent or intentional misconduct by either the parties or the mediator"). It
should be noted that confidentiality and privilege rules tend to be much looser when the mediator
is accused of actual wrongdoing. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 528.
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